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1. Introduction
1 
This paper empirically picks out the main determinants that urge banks to securitize their 
loans – or that did so before the crisis. The interest in studying bank loan securitization was 
already justified by their dramatic increase in the last decade but has been further strengthened 
exactly by recent events in the financial markets.
2 
First, before the meltdown, the strong development of bank securitization led to theories 
about a new banking model, defined as the “originate-to-distribute” (O&D) model, because banks 
were  no  longer  the  originators  and  holders  of  loans,  but  had  become  the  originators  and 
distributors to the capital markets of both credit and related risks. Selling loans that were once 
considered  non-marketable  assets  signalled  a  fundamental  change  in  banking  activity.  Two 
typical banking functions lost importance: liquidity transformation (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) 
and delegated monitoring (Diamond, 1984). Banks are no longer the primary holders of illiquid 
assets and so securitizing banks have less incentive to monitor their borrowers (e.g. Pennacchi, 
1988; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Loutskina and Strahan, 2007; Keys et al., 2008; BIS, 2008). 
This potentially significant change in activity raises the question as to what induces (or induced) 
banks to revise one of their basic business activities. 
Second, since the outset of the downturn, several scholars have stressed the link between 
securitization and the financial turmoil. Indeed, many of them find the main feature of the crisis  
in securitizations. Adrian and Shin (2008b) and Greenlaw et al. (2008) highlight the fact that “the 
current credit crisis has the distinction of being the first post-securitization crisis”. Borio (2008) 
thinks  that  “the  O&D  model  may  have  contributed  both  to  the  build-up  of  risk  and  to  the 
turbulence that followed.” Brunnermeier (2008) points out that “what is new about this crisis is 
the extent of securitization.” As summarized by Draghi (2008c), securitizations are a double-
edged sword. Together with the other credit risk transfer (CRT) instruments, securitizations have 
been viewed either as a positive element of financial innovation or as a negative device of the 
distorted incentives that preceded the credit crisis (Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008; Shin, 2008). 
The positive view, prevalent before 2007 (e.g. Greenspan, 2000), emphasized the role played by 
                                                 
1 Corresponding author: massimiliano.affinito@bancaditalia.it. We would like to thank, for their helpful comments, 
Riccardo De Bonis, Alessio De Vincenzo, Fabio Farabullini, Michele Fratianni, Matteo Piazza, Alfonso Rosolia, 
Bernd Schwaab, Paolo Sestito, Luigi Federico Signorini, Alberto Zazzaro, two anonymous referees, and participants 
at the seminar held at the Bank of Italy (Rome, July 2008), the “International Conference on Price, Liquidity and 
Credit  Risks”  (University  of  Konstanz, October  2008)  and  the  seminar  held  at  the  Università  Politecnica  delle 
Marche  (Ancona,  November  2008).  The  opinions  expressed  in  this  paper  are  those  of  the  authors  and  do  not 
necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy. 
2 Here we refer to securitization as any activity involving the pooling and repackaging of loans into securities, which 
are then sold to different kinds of investors, typically other banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and mutual 
funds.    6
securitization activity in: enabling a more efficient allocation of risk to a wider range of agents; 
allowing  more  effective  risk  management;  in  relaxing  constraints  on  credit  availability;  and 
enhancing transparency, pricing and market liquidity. In short, the positive view underlined in the 
coexistence of financial stability and the exceptional boom in credit growth. The negative view, 
which became predominant after the financial turmoil (BIS, 2008; ECB, 2008; FSF, 2008a) but 
existed before it (CGFS, 2003 and 2005; Rajan, 2005; Fender and Mitchell, 2005; BIS, 2006; 
Allen and Carletti, 2006), emphasizes that the securitization chain misaligns incentives, leads to 
contagion between different sectors, and increases the risk of crisis. However, sill recently, the 
FSF (2008a) confirmed that securitization markets and the O&D model worked well for many 
years and that, when accompanied by adequate risk management and incentives, they offer a 
number of benefits to loan originators, investors and borrowers. At any rate, even though the 
financial crisis is not the focus of our paper, the suggested link between securitization and the 
crisis renders the analysis of the determinants of bank securitizations even more interesting.  
As  dealt  with  in  the  next  section,  the  literature  agrees  that  the  question  of  what  the 
determinants of securitization are is mostly an empirical one. The question first arose during the 
1980s when a strand of US research dealt with the determinants of loan sales, an instrument only 
partially different from loan securitization (Giddy, 1985; Pavel, 1986; Pavel and Phillis, 1987; 
James, 1988; Donahoo and Shaffer, 1991). More recently, while the literature examining the 
effects of securitization is more considerable,
3 a few papers took an empirical look at the other 
side of the cause-effect nexus. The bulk of work covers the case of the United States, but now 
there are some European analyses as well. This paper joins in this empirical research, which is 
reviewed in detail in the following sections. Our work has the advantage of: (a) analysing all the 
banks in a country, using Italian bank-by-bank data from 2000 to 2006 (the Italian law governing 
bank loan securitization was passed in 1999); (b) verifying the determinants of both the decision 
to  securitize  and  the  amounts  securitized;  (c)  allowing  for  the  securitized  loans  where  the 
originator bank continues to bear the risk;; (d) using as a measure of capital requirements the real 
solvency position of the banks; (e) employing several econometric models; and (f) controlling for 
endogeneity, autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems. 
Our  findings  are  both  robust  and  economically  relevant.  They  show  that  bank 
securitization finance involves many decisions. The banks most likely to perform securitization 
                                                 
3 Empirical literature, which analyses the effects rather than the determinants of securitizations, provides evidence 
that the option of transferring credit risk reduced in the USA the incentives of banks to screen and monitor loans and 
lowered lending standards (Demyanyk and van Hemert, 2007; Mian and Sufi, 2007; Loutskina and Strahan, 2007; 
Keys et al., 2008; Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven, 2008).    7
are those that are less capitalized, less profitable, less liquid and more risk-prone,. They also tend 
to securitize larger amounts and to do so earlier.   
The rest of the paper is divided into six sections. Section 2 reviews the possible reasons 
that  spur  banks  to  securitize  their  loans  according  to  the  literature.  Section  3  describes  our 
estimation models. Section 4 presents our data and provides some descriptive statistics on Italian 
bank loan securitizations. Section 5 shows our main results and compares them with the recent 
literature. Section 6 summarizes all our robustness checks. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature 
The literature dealing with securitization proposes four main determinants of the decision 
to securitize bank loans: the need for new sources of funding, the transfer of credit riskiness, the 
search for new profit opportunities, and the role of capital.
4  
The first reason to securitize is linked to liquidity and funding needs. Banks may sell 
loans in order to fund their assets without trying to attract more retail deposits owing to their 
shortage or cost (e.g. James, 1988; Stanton, 1998 and 2002; DeYoung and Rice, 2004; Parlour 
and Plantin, 2008). Similarly, banks may securitize loans instead of raising deposits because they 
compete with commercial papers if these are preferred by investors or in order to attract long-
term  funds  (e.g.  Estrella,  2002;  Loutskina  and  Strahan,  2007).  It  is  important  to  note  that 
securitization  provides  a  funding  source  that  has  the  benefit  of  not  being  subject  to  deposit 
insurance and reserve requirements. 
The second determinant regards risk exposure. As known, loan securitization represents 
one of the main instruments for transferring credit risk. Hence banks with a higher share of risky 
loans may securitize more in order to reduce the burden on their balance sheets (Cumming, 1987; 
Flannery, 1994; Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven, 2008) or to reduce the related expected losses 
(Dahiya, Puri and Saunders, 2003; Marsh, 2006). By contrast, part of the literature suggests that 
banks could have an incentive to securitize high-quality loans and to retain low-quality loans. 
This happens when economic capital linked to market discipline is much less than regulated 
capital and highly risk-weighted assets allow a reasonable balance between return and safety.
5 
                                                 
4 The literature on the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy highlights that loan securitization reduces the 
importance of the bank lending channel. In fact, thanks to securitizations, bank size is less important because they 
reduce the amount of loans on the balance sheet; bank liquidity becomes less worrying because of the short-term 
inflows of loan sales; bank capitalization should matter less because the transfer of part of the credit risk reduces 
capital requirements and permits an increase of lending supply. This strand of research is sufficient to infer three out 
of the four determinants of the decision to securitize. 
5 Other reasons to retain low-quality loans regard asymmetric information and bank reputation. First, riskier loans are 
harder for outside investors to value and hence they are more costly to sell due to the lemons problem. Second, since   8
For example, banks could sell loans of high quality and use the proceeds to lend to riskier borrowers 
increasing the expected returns with no change in capital requirements, thus aligning economic and 
regulated  capital  (Greenbaum  and  Thakor,  1987).  This  idea  is  corroborated  by  Kohen  and 
Santomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988), Flannery (1989) and Blum (1999), who argued 
that improperly chosen risk weights increase the riskiness of banks. Nevertheless, their analysis 
has been variously criticised. Furlog and Keeley (1989, 1990) and Rochet (1992) showed that 
capital requirements reduce risk-taking incentives if banks possess a diversified portfolio. In any 
case, in this debate, the basic effect on securitization would not be due to the quality of loans, but 
to capital requirements and to profit considerations, which represent specific further determinants 
of securitization (Drucker and Puri, 2006; Duffie, 2008).  
The third determinant of securitization activity suggested by the literature refers precisely 
to  profit  opportunities.  Securitization  allows  banks  to  recognize  accounting  gains,  when  the 
market values of loans exceed their book values, and overvaluation of the retained interest that is 
carried at fair market value in the case of securitizations (James, 1988; Flannery, 1989 and 1994; 
Donahoo and Shaffer, 1991; DeMarzo, 2005; Karaoglu, 2005). Moreover, banks can redeploy 
their sold loans towards more profitable business opportunities (Greenspan, 2004; Schuermann, 
2004). In addition, banks may securitize loans designed specifically for an intermediation profit 
rather than for long-run warehousing (Duffie, 2008). 
Finally,  the  fourth  reason  to  securitize  involves  bank  capital.  In  order  to  meet  both 
economic capital requirements, linked to market discipline, and mandatory capital requirements, 
linked to regulation, banks traditionally had two ways to choose from. Either they altered the 
numerator, for instance by retaining earnings and issuing equity, or the denominator, by cutting 
back assets and reducing lending or shifting into low risk-weighted assets.
6 Securitization allows 
a  third  way:  banks  can  adjust  their  capital  ratios  by  engaging  in  securitization.  Loan 
securitizations  avoid  the  disadvantages  of  warehousing  loans  and  then  they  automatically 
decrease regulatory and market capital requirements (Berger and Udell, 1993; Froot, Scharfstein 
and  Stein,  1993;  Jagtiani,  Saunders  and  Udell,  1995;  Carlstrom  and  Samolyk,  1995;  Berger, 
                                                                                                                                                              
securitization finance has a repeated game structure, banks have an interest in maintaining their reputation so as not 
to lose market access.  
6 A large volume of literature studies the general effects of capital requirements on banks’ conduct and then on their 
balance sheet items (Hall, 1993; Berger and Udell, 1994; Kim and Moreno, 1994; Hancock, Laing and Wilcox, 1995; 
Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; Thakor, 1996; Jacques and Nigro, 1997; Aggarwal and Jacques, 1998; Jackson et al., 1999; 
Rime, 2001; Aggarwal and Jacques, 2001; Dionne and Harchaoui, 2003; VanHoose, 2007). This literature shows that 
since it is often too costly to issue new shares and the cost of equity is generally perceived to be greater than the cost 
of debt, banks tend to reduce lending rather than to increase capital. Further, the literature on the bank capital channel 
literature shows that less-capitalized banks need to adjust lending more to absorb output shocks (e.g. Gambacorta and 
Mistrulli, 2004).   9
Herring and Szego, 1995; Allen, Jagtiani and Landskroner, 1996; Froot and Stein, 1998; Jackson 
et al., 1999; Jones, 2000; CGFS, 2003; Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marqués, 2007; FSF, 2008a). 
To exemplify, it is possible to list at least five not mutually exclusive cases in which bank 
capital can affect securitization finance. First, low-capitalized banks might securitize their loans 
to  adapt  to  mandatory  capital  adequacy  ratios,  although  adaptation  to  regulatory  minimum 
requirements  seems  the  least  likely  reason  to  release  capital  as  banks,  broadly  speaking, 
continuously  hold  capital  in  excess  of  regulatory  minima.
7  Second,  more  probably,  less-
capitalized banks may securitize loans to free up portions of capital, for example in order to 
expand new and, if possible, more profitable assets. Third, through securitization, faster growing 
banks will see the advantage of being healthy and maintaining low capital. Fourth, some banks 
might operate with lower average capitalization just because they choose to become skilful at 
securitizing loans on a regular basis. Fifth, less-capitalized banks may securitize loans to flaunt 
higher so-called capital cushions, when for example they are rewarded by rating agencies, or they 
may maintain levels of capital in excess of their minimum requirements as a means of satisfying 
market requirements.
8  
When  the  determinants  of  loan  securitization  involve  bank  capital,  several  scholars 
highlight that there can be the risk of regulatory capital arbitrage, in the sense that banks could 
use securitization to reduce their regulatory capital requirements spuriously (e.g. James, 1988; 
Flannery, 1989 and 1994; Donahoo and Shaffer, 1991; DeMarzo, 2005; Karaoglu, 2005; Jackson 
et al., 1999; Jones, 2000; Calomiris and Mason, 2004; Jobst, 2005; Ambrose, Lacour-Little and 
Sanders, 2005; VanHoose, 2007; FSF, 2008a,b; Kashyap, Rajan and Stein, 2008; BIS, 2008; 
Borio,  2008;  Parlour  and  Plantin,  2008;  Draghi  2008a,b,c;  Shin,  2008;  Adrian  and  Shin, 
2008a,b,c; Greenlaw et al., 2008). Actually, the literature is not entirely unanimous even in the 
definition  of  regulatory  capital  arbitrage.  Some  authors  effectively  view  regulatory  capital 
arbitrage as opportunistic behaviour that arises only if there is a malicious intent (e.g. Jackson et 
al., 1999; Jones, 2000; Jobst, 2005; FSF, 2008; BIS, 2008; Borio, 2008). Others point out that 
regulatory capital arbitrage could occur whenever a bank realizes a capital saving (e.g. Ambrose, 
Lacour-Little  and  Sanders,  2005)  and  in  this  sense,  as  argued  by  Kashyap,  Rajan  and  Stein 
(2008),  any  system  of  capital  regulation  inevitably  creates  a  tendency  towards  regulatory 
arbitrage. In any case, the general consensus stresses that capital saving may cause concern only 
                                                 
7 On this evidence and on the reasons why banks prefer holding capital ratios that exceed the regulatory minima, see 
Gropp and Heider (2007); Flannery and Rangan (2008); Berger et al. (2008); and Allen, Carletti and Marquez 
(2008).  
8 Van den Heuvel (2005) shows that even if capital is greater than regulatory capital requirements, lower capitalized 
banks may optimally forgo lending opportunities in order to lower the risk of capital inadequacy in the future. In a 
similar way, loan securitizations might be used.    10
if securitizing banks reduce their capital requirements without commensurately reducing their 
asset risk. On the contrary, if securitization truly transfers risks off the balance sheet, then lower 
bank capital ratios would be consistent with lower insolvency risk. Indeed, the theory argues that 
under certain conditions, if banks securitize through true sales and they do not retain risks in 
securitized loans, capital arbitrage is socially desirable because it allows a more efficient match 
between economic and regulatory capital (Calomiris and Mason, 2004). In this paper we analyse 
the effect of capital on the decision of engaging in loan securitization in line with the previously 
exemplified cases. By contrast, we do not deal with the issue of regulatory capital arbitrage, 
which would need an ad hoc analysis that goes beyond our purposes in this work.  
Needless to say that the role of the single determinants reviewed so far can be linked. For 
example, if a bank securitizes its loans to release capital with the goal of striking out towards new 
and more profitable investments, the causal effect can be empirically found significant both for 
capital and profits. However, in the same way, the effects may be completely independent. For 
example, through securitization, banks can pursue new profits or solve funding needs even if they 
are well-capitalized. They can increase capital even if they have high profits. Therefore it is still 
worth analysing the role of all the determinants separately. 
3. Methodology  
To verify the ex ante determinants of securitization activity, our general specification is as 
follows: 
Yit = f (Xit ; Zit); 
where Y are the bank loan securitizations; f(.) stands for a distribution function; X and Z contain 
mostly  banks’  individual  characteristics;  X  are  regressors  proxying  the  four  main  factors 
underlying the securitization decision reviewed in the previous section: funding, risk transfer, 
profit opportunities and capital; Z covers control variables; sub-index i refers to banks and t to the 
time periods.  
We carry out our estimations using different models because we investigate the double 
decision  faced  by  each  bank  of  whether  or  not  to  securitize  and  then  how  much,  if  any,  to 
securitize.  
In order to predict the probability that a bank securitizes its loans, we use both probit and 
logit models. In these models, the securitized loans’ amount represents our latent variable, while 
the observed variable can only be equivalent to one (bank i securitizes) or to zero (bank i does not 
securitize). For the sake of brevity, logit and probit estimation results are reported alternately 
since they are very similar.   11
In  order  to  estimate  the  share  of  loans  that  banks  will  securitize,  we  use  three  tobit 
models: the standard tobit model, the tobit II model and the random effects tobit model. In these 
models, the dependent variable has a constrained range that is zero for a substantial part of the 
population and is continuous: the share of securitized loans issued yearly by each bank, obtained 
as the yearly sum of monthly securitization operations, on total assets. 
The first model, the standard tobit, has also been adopted by several related papers and 
this allows us to use the same framework to compare our outcomes with those of other papers on 
the same subject. The so-called tobit II model is used because it allows us to overcome empirical 
problems inherent to the standard tobit model. In fact, the structure of the standard tobit model 
(also  defined  as  tobit  I)  could  be  too  restrictive  because  the  same  covariates  affecting  the 
probability of a non-zero decision also determine the level of a positive observation. Empirically, 
the tobit II model, also referred to as the sample selection model and estimated by the Heckman 
two-steps approach, can be thought of as consisting of two parts: the first part describes the 
binary decision of whether to securitize or not; and the second part describes the distribution of 
the securitized loans for those banks which actually securitize. Finally, the random effects tobit 
model  allows  us  to  exploit  the  fact  that  our  data  are  over-time    and  to  pay  attention  to 
heterogeneity with the inclusion of individual effects in the conditional mean. The tobit model for 
panel data is usually estimated by random effects rather than by fixed effects because the fixed 
effects estimations require a very high number of periods (the so-called incidental parameter 
problem).  
Our empirical analysis includes other models – the hazard model, instrumental variables 
(IV) regression, two generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimators – that are used only as 
robustness checks and are detailed in Section 6. In particular, the IV and GMM regressions, even 
if they are less appropriate for our data compared to the previous models, have the purpose to 
allow for endogeneity, autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems. 
4. Data and bank loan securitization in Italy 
Our  estimations  use  annual  Italian  bank-by-bank  data  from  2000  (the  first  year  after 
Italian law on bank loan securitization was passed) to 2006. Data refer to all Italian banks. Data 
on securitizations are drawn from two different sources that report different details: the Bank of 
Italy’s accounting supervisory reports and the Italian Central Credit Register.
9 
                                                 
9  The  first  data  source  reports  information  on  monthly  total  securitized  loans  and  the  distinction  between 
securitizations performed through special purpose vehicles and not. The Central Credit Register reports the amounts 
of securitizations performed either on performing loans or on bad debts, and the loan counterparty sector of activity.   12
Since  we  use  Italian  data,  before  proceeding  to  detail  our  dataset,  it  is  interesting  to 
describe some stylized facts on bank loan securitization in Italy. As in other countries, Italian 
securitization finance grew rapidly from 1999 onwards. In eight years, the number of special 
purpose vehicles (SPVs) reached more than 300 entities (Table 1). Bank loan securitizations for 
the year amounted to 16 billion euros in 2000 and this figure more than doubled in 2007. The 
number of banks performing at least one securitization operation rose from 29 in 2000 to 138 in 
2007. Nevertheless, the kind of securitizations partially changed. The share of bad loans on total 
securitized loans decreased over time, apart from in 2005 (Figure 1). The percentage share of 
securitized loans to non-financial firms decreased from 74 per cent in 2000 to about 37 per cent 
in 2006-2007; while the percentage share of securitized loans to households increased from 22 
per cent in 2000 to 48 per cent in 2006 and 58 per cent in 2007 (Figure 2). 
As  mentioned,  our  dependent  variables  are:  in  the  probit  and  logit  models,  dummy 
assuming value 1 if bank i carried out at least one securitization operation during year t; in the 
tobit models, the share of yearly securitized loans by each bank on total assets. We preferred to 
use annual data because monthly figures would artificially multiply the number of observations 
and would entail a random distribution of securitization activity.  
In  assembling  our  dependent  variables,  we  take  into  account  those  loans  that,  while 
securitized, remain on banks’ balance sheets (retained securitized loans), drawing our information 
from Bank of Italy supervisory reports. In fact, securitized loans are often tranched into risk 
classes  that  display  specific  risk-return  characteristics  and  the  principle  of  subordination, 
according to which base the tranches of highest risk are most susceptible to default. In many 
cases, securitizing banks retain just the highest risk tranches and/or other tranches in order to 
overcome problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. In fact, there is a lemon problem 
intrinsic to securitization activity because banks have better information on the creditworthiness 
of their borrowers, and they could overstate the credit quality of the transferred loans and have an 
incentive to prematurely trigger a credit event. Just to align the interests of securitizing banks and 
investors, instruments such as pooling, tranching and retention of tranches have been devised 
(Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; DeMarzo and Duffie, 1999; Duffee and Zhou, 2001; Kiff, Michaud 
and Mitchell, 2002; Morrison, 2005; Sufi, 2006; Pagano and Volpin, 2008). The retained tranches 
are not pure securitizations because they are securitized loans that remain on the balance sheet 
and hence they do not transfer risk. In order to allow for them, we subtract the yearly amount of   13
all retained securitized loans from the total yearly amount of securitized loans before obtaining 
our dependent variables.
10 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of our variables. As shown, controlling for retained 
securitized loans reduces the number of our sample observations because it increases the missing 
values. However, as a robustness check, we also ran regressions without controlling for retained 
securitized loans. 
Bank-specific  covariates  are  drawn  from  Bank  of  Italy  supervisory  reports  as  well. 
Dummy variables apart, all regressors are ratios or natural logarithms. Our regressors proxy the 
four basic underlying factors in the securitization decision and some control variables. First, the 
ratio between total deposits and total assets proxies how the funding needs affect securitization 
activity. The sign should be negative since banks with a larger amount of deposits need fewer 
alternative financing sources. Second, the effect of risk assets is seized by the ratio of bad loans 
on total loans. The expected sign is positive if securitizer banks are those with low-quality high-
risk assets. On the contrary, it is negative if banks retain riskier loans. Third, in order to assess the 
effect of capital, we use the effective solvency ratio calculated as the quotient between regulatory 
capital and credit and market risk weighted assets. The expected sign is negative if banks use 
securitization to release or to make free a portion of their capital. Fourth, the ratio of return on 
equity (ROE) weighs the effect of profit development on the securitization choice. Banks with 
lower profits are likely to resort to loan securitizations to improve their profitability. 
The other bank-specific regressors are mainly used as control variables, i.e. to check the 
results allowing for other factors. However, these further regressors are susceptible to economic 
interpretation as well. The natural logarithm of total assets is a proxy of bank size. The expected 
sign is statistically significant if asset size matters in securitization activity. It is positive if only 
larger banks have the necessary skills to securitize their loans. The ratio between non-interest 
income  and  interest  income  is  a  measure  of  banking  activity  diversification.  The  effect  on 
securitizations  can  be  twofold.  In  fact,  regarding  the  composition  of  banks’  portfolios, 
securitizing allows banks to sell certain types of loans and to originate other types of assets to 
diversify their businesses (e.g. Demsetz, 1999); or alternatively, banks may sell loans in order to 
concentrate their loan portfolio on certain types of loans for which they have a comparative 
advantage, thus achieving economies of scale (e.g. Phillips, 1996). Therefore, the sign is expected 
                                                 
10 To control for retained securitized loans, we use other two methods to check for robustness (Section 6) because 
data on securitization and on retained securitized loans are partially different. The securitization data are the yearly 
sums of monthly securitization operations, while data on retained securitized loans are end-of-year stocks. However, 
since we analyse Italian loan securitizations since their introduction, when we subtract the year change of retained 
securitized loans from the total yearly amount of securitized loans, we obtain a good proxy of the real size of loans 
sold to outside investors.   14
to be positive if only those banks that differentiate their activity are able to securitize their loans; 
while the sign is negative if banks use loan securitization just to increase diversification and 
therefore the less diversified a bank is, the more likely that bank would be to securitize loans. The 
growth rate of loans can be read as measure of bank activity development or as a further proxy of 
liquidity  needs  to  fund  loan  development.  The  ratios  between  bonds  issued  and  government 
securities  held  in  a  bank’s  portfolio  and  total  assets  may  be  viewed  as  further  measures  of 
liquidity  needs; the  net  interbank position/total  assets ratio  may be  viewed  as proxy  of both 
funding and profit opportunities. The remaining covariates are two dummies assuming value 1 if 
bank i is a credit cooperative bank or if it is involved in a banking group. The two dummies are 
used tor see whether these types of banks have different incentives to securitize their loans.  
Apart from these dummies, all regressors are calculated with a lag. The idea is that, for 
instance, supervisory capital in time t–1 affects the securitization decision in time t. Furthermore, 
these  lags  help  to  resolve  possible  endogeneity  problems.  Table  3  shows  the  correlation 
coefficients among variables. 
5. Results  
The results of our estimations are reported in Table 4 for four models (probit, tobit I, tobit 
II and random effects tobit) and two specifications. Our basic specification (1) contains the four 
main determinants of the decision to securitize proposed by the literature: funding, risk transfer, 
profit opportunities and capital. Specification (2) is different from specification (1) due to the 
presence of the lagged dependent variable. Its estimation allows us to control for heterogeneity 
and autocorrelation when we also run the two GMM estimators.  
Even if in the discrete choice models, the accuracy tests (McFadden’s pseudo-R
2 and R
2) 
typically take values that are much lower than the R
2 in the OLS model, the Wald and LR tests 
indicate the good quality of our estimations. As for tobit II, the coefficient of λ does not allow us 
to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation, while the estimated correlation coefficient ρ equals 
only to -0.08 indicates that the tobit II model is appropriate. Even if there are changes in the 
coefficients’ size, the results strengthen those of the other models because they are obtained after 
controlling for all determinants in the first step. In general, the four main determinants proposed 
by the literature to explain securitization activity are significant. Therefore our first result is that 
bank loan securitization is a composite and many-sided decision. Results are univocal and robust 
across methods and specifications, with the possible exceptions of the funding proxy and the 
lagged dependent variable, to which we return in detail in Section 6.    15
As  far  as  the  funding  proxy  is  concerned,  the  coefficient  of  the  ratio  between  total 
deposits and total assets in time t–1 is always negative. It follows that more liquid banks do not 
need to liquidate their loans. Nevertheless, maybe the funding reason is not decisive since its 
effect loses statistical significance when we apply the static random effects tobit model.  
Banks with a strong share of bad loans on total loans in time t–1 engage in securitization 
more often and for larger amounts in time t. The result, always highly significant, is consistent 
with Pais (2005), Gorton and Souleles (2005), Bannier and Hänsel (2007) and Martin-Oliver and 
Saurina  (2007),  who  find  that  riskier  firms  securitize  more.  On  the  contrary,  this  result  is 
countered  in  De  Marzo  and  Duffie  (1999),  Calem  and  Lacour-Little  (2004),  and  Ambrose, 
Lacour-Little and Sanders (2005) according to whom assets of higher quality seem to be sold 
whereas poorer quality assets tend to remain on bank’s balance sheets. However, as argued by 
Drucker and Puri (2006) and Duffie (2008), banks seem to securitize high-quality loans when 
other factors are not controlled for. In fact, banks would retain low-quality loans when their after 
tax return is higher than that of less risky assets and when economic capital linked to market 
discipline is much less than regulated capital (see Section 2). Since in our estimations, we capture 
the effect of capital and profits through specific regressors, the effect of bad loans is genuinely 
positive. 
The effect of ROE in time t–1 indicates that the more profitable a bank is, the less likely it 
is  to  securitize  loans.  All  the  empirical  literature  obtained  a  similar  relationship  between 
profitability measures and securitization activity.  
The  ratio  between  supervisory  capital  and  total  risk-weighed  assets  in  the  period  t–1 
negatively affects both the probability and the size of securitization operations in time t. Our 
result is consistent with the results of other analyses (Passmore, Sparks and Ingpen, 2002; Calem 
and Lacour Little, 2004; Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004; Calomiris and Mason, 2004; Karaoglu, 
2005; Ambrose, Lacour-Little and Sanders, 2005; Pais, 2005; Jiangli and Pritsker, 2008). By 
contrast, four recent empirical papers (Minton et al., 2004; Bannier and Hänsel, 2007; Martin-
Oliver and Saurina, 2007; Agostino and Mazzucca, 2008) have partially disputed this result and 
therefore merit a brief review. 
Actually, of those four papers, only one (Minton et al., 2004) reaches a very different 
result, but they seem to follow a deductive argument. They say that since unregulated finance 
companies and investment banks are more likely to securitize than regulated banks, this implies 
that securitization is not for the purposes of regulatory capital arbitrage and therefore the effect of 
capital is not essential. Moreover, in their sample the share of financial securitizing firms is very 
small (around 4 per cent); their analysis is limited to larger firms, and their measure of the capital   16
ratio is not the solvency ratio but the simple quotient between total book value of equity and total 
assets.
11 The other three papers analyse European banks and, even if they de-emphasize the result 
of capital, they cannot actually deny its negative effect on bank loan securitization.Indirectly, 
therefore,  their  outcomes  corroborate  ours.  Bannier  and  Hänsel  (2007)  make  a  cross-country 
analysis of a sample of European banks for the period 1997-2004 and conclude that securitization 
activity  seems  to  be  strongly  affected  by  bank-specific  characteristics  rather  than  by 
macroeconomic factors. They underline that banks primarily use securitization to transfer and 
source  risk  in  the  market.  However,  although  their  information  about  tier  1  capital  is  only 
available for a subgroup of banks, they cannot reject the fact that this influences banks’ incentives 
to reduce regulatory capital, mainly for stock-listed banks. Martin-Oliver and Saurina (2007) find 
that liquidity needs were the main driver of securitization activities in Spain between 1999 and 
2006. Nevertheless, although these authors do not control for endogeneity in any way, when they 
extend the analysis to a tobit model, they recognize that the amount of assets securitized increases 
as the solvency ratio of the bank decreases. Agostino and Mazzucca (2008) conclude that the 
funding hypothesis is the most consistent. However, they can only analyse a sample of Italian 
banks  between  1999  and  2006;  they  do  not  control  for  endogeneity  and  their  controls  for 
heterogeneity are limited. Nevertheless, when they extend their analysis by carrying out some 
robustness checks and by adding the random effects probit model to the probit one, they find that 
the role of capital becomes more significant. 
In specification (2) we added the lagged dependent variable. As expected, its coefficient is 
the most unstable, signalling possible problems of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity and thus 
we also used the two GMM estimators detailed in Section 6.
12 However, the results allow us to 
highlight two outcomes. First, the presence of the lagged dependent variable neither nullifies nor 
influences the results of the other variables. Second, whenever it is statistically significant, its 
sign is positive. Therefore the incentive to carry out loan securitizations increases if a bank has 
already securitized loans in the previous year and if the share of securitized loans was higher. 
This result could indicate the existence of economies of scale in securitization activity, as pointed 
out for instance by Minton et al. (1997). Alternatively, there could be a demand side effect, in the 
sense that investors tend to rely on banks that have previously succeeded in securitizing loans.  
                                                 
11 On the use of the solvency ratio as a preferable variable to analyse banks’ conduct, see Gambacorta and Mistrulli 
(2004).  
12 A resoluble problem arises with the dynamic random effects tobit model if the process we are estimating has been 
going on for a number of periods before the current sample period. The dependent variable in the first period should 
be conditional upon the unobserved heterogeneity but without knowing the previous state. This is not the case in our 
exercises because we estimate Italian bank loan securitization activity from the outset. See Verbeek (2004); Baltagi 
(2005).   17
In  order  to  measure  the  relative  weight  of  the  four  regressors  through  their  marginal 
effects, we exploit the basic specification (1) of both the probit model and the tobit I model.
13 
What emerges is that even if loan securitization increased in our sample period as shown in Table 
1,  the  probability  of  a  loan  securitization  and  the  average  share  of  securitized  loans  are  on 
average relatively low. The probability of engaging in securitization is only 4 per cent and the 
average securitized loans/total assets ratio is 0.010. Banks’ capital is the main determinant, by a 
small margin, of securitization both in terms of probability and of quantity. In fact, when we pass 
from the 25
th to the 75
th distribution percentile of the ratio of total deposits on total assets, the 
probability of loan securitization decreases from 6 to 4 per cent and the securitized loans/total 
assets ratio decreases from 0.012 to 0.009. It increases, respectively, from 4 to 5 per cent and 
from 0 to 0.015 for the ratio of bad loans on total loans and decreases from 6 to 4 per cent and 
from 0.018 to 0.008 for the ROE. When we consider the ratio between supervisory capital and 
total risk-weighed assets, the probability of securitization and the share of securitized loans on 
total assets assume the value of, respectively, 3 per cent and 0.004 at the 75
th percentile; just 
under 6 percent and 0.018 at the 25
th percentile, and 6 per cent and 0.019 at the Basle I threshold.  
Table 5 shows the means of the four basic regressors and the statistical significance of 
their differences when we split the sample period of securitizer banks in three time spans: the 
years before the first securitization, the year of the first securitization and the years after the first 
securitization. The idea of this exercise is that if the four determinants have a role not only in 
dividing not-securitizing banks from securitizers (affecting the decision of securitizing and its 
amount)  but  also  in  splitting  banks  before  and  after  securitization,  this  corroborates  that  the 
determinants did affect the decision to securitize. In other words, Table 5 confirms that the four 
factors are the driving forces behind the decision of securitization since securitization allows 
banks to modify them (for a similar approach, see for example Calomiris and Mason, 2004; 
Santos and Winton, 2009). Moreover, this exercise allows us to shed some light on how those 
factors change after securitization. 
In particular, results show that there is a statistically significant difference between the 
stages before and at securitization, and the stages before and after securitization, while there is no 
significant difference between the first securitization and the following ones. This seems to imply 
that  the  subsequent  operations  do  not  have  different  determinants  compared  with  the  first 
securitization. Furthermore, results suggest that once banks securitize they operate with lower 
capital or put the capital they have into some new businesses, decrease the weight of bad loans, 
reduce  the  funds  raised  through  deposits  and  then  increase  profitability.  These  results  are 
                                                 
13 The marginal effects calculated on the other models and specifications provide similar results and are available 
upon request.    18
coherent with Jiangli and Pritsker (2008) who find that securitization was able to reduce risks and 
increase the profitability of US banks; and with Di Cesare (2009) who finds that Italian banks that 
securitized have a smaller share of bad loans and a reduction in their expected credit losses. 
As expected, securitization does not seem to be used to comply with mandatory capital 
ratios  since  securitizing  banks  exceed  the  minimum  requirements  even  before  the  first 
securitization. Neither result seems to corroborate the idea that securitization raises the levels of 
capital since this remains on average below the previous share of total assets. By contrast, results 
are consistent with the other options reviewed in Section 2: securitization can be used to operate 
with less capital and/or to free up portions of capital for expanding new assets and/or exploiting 
securitization on a regular basis. 
6. Robustness checks 
Robustness of the previous results has been checked in several ways. In this section, we 
summarize all our robustness checks and report some of them in Tables 6 and 7. However, the 
other checks are available on request. For example, as previously explained, our first check was 
on the alternation and the combination of models and specifications. Nevertheless, even if we 
applied  all  the  methods  to  all  our  specifications  (where  appropriate)  in  order  to  ensure 
completeness and concision, in Tables 6 and 7 we variously combined eight models (probit, logit, 
tobit I, tobit II, random effects tobit, IV, Areallano Bond and GMM) on ten specifications. In 
particular, Table 6, which contains specifications from (3) to (8), demonstrates the stability of the 
results  by  adding  and  alternating  the  use  of  our  control  variables.  Table  7,  which  contains 
specifications  (9)  and  (10),  shows  the  stability  of  the  results  allowing  for  endogeneity, 
heterogeneity and autocorrelation. 
6.1 Adding fixed effects, control variables and time spans 
One concern is that results may be driven by selection across banks and years. As a 
control for this and in general in order to allow for the possible effect of omitted variables or 
macroeconomic trends, we arranged our tests as follows. First, we added both a bank-by-bank 
dummy and a time dummy to our cross-section models, as exemplified in specifications (3) and 
(6). Second, we alternated the use of other control regressors. Third, in order to take account of 
the time elapsed for  many banks before engaging in securitization, we re-ran regressions by 
splitting our sample period into different time spans. In all cases the results remained stable, 
including the lower statistical significance of the funding proxy. 
As previously noted, our control explanatory variables, added in specifications (4), (5), 
(7), (8) and (10), may be interpreted as well. In addition to the deposits/total assets ratio, the   19
funding needs may also be captured also by the growth rate of loans in t–1, which has a positive 
impact on the amount of securitized loans in t (specifications 5, 7 and 8). This indicates that the 
development  of  bank  lending  increases  the  need  to  disinvest  part  of  the  loan  portfolio  and 
contributes to attribute a role to funding reasons. The natural logarithm of total assets in time t–1, 
which proxies the banks’ size, affects positively both the decision and the share of securitized 
loans  (specifications  4  and  5).  The  result  indicates  the  importance  of  sophisticated  bank 
management.  The  non-interest  income/interest  income  ratio  positively  affects  the  share  of 
securitized loans (specifications 5, 7, 8 and 10), supporting the idea that more diversified banks 
are more likely to carry out loan securitization operations. The two dummies capturing the credit 
cooperative banks and the institutions belonging to banking groups do not affect securitization 
finance in any way once the other determinants have been included (specification 8). 
6.2 Controlling for endogeneity, autocorrelation and heterogeneity 
As  previously  mentioned,  a  second  concern  regards  the  problems  of  endogeneity, 
autocorrelation  and  heterogeneity  that  may  be  present  in  our  data.  To  control  for  these,  we 
improve our analysis mainly by implementing other models: the IV and the GMM estimations. 
Needless to say, these regressions are less suitable to our data than the basic models used in 
Section 5. Nevertheless, even if with this caveat and albeit they are not our first choice, these 
models allow us to take account of those specific inferential problems. 
In particular, the endogeneity problem was addressed in two ways. As described above, 
the first approach consisted simply in calculating all regressors with a lag. The second approach 
was based on the use of IV regressions, where the dependent variable is, as in the three tobit 
models, the share of volume issued by each bank each year. Since potentially all our four basic 
regressors may have problems of endogeneity with the dependent variable, we adopted a multiple 
endogenous regression, where for each potential endogenous regressor an instrumental variable is 
included. As a vector of instruments, we tested alternately either the same four basic regressors 
computed with two lags
14 or the other control regressors. In specification (9), we chose to present 
only the first case because the Staiger and Stock (1997) methodology, based on the significance 
and size of the coefficients in the first step of the instrumental regression, showed us that lagged 
regressors have better properties which turn out not to be weak instruments.  
As far as heterogeneity is concerned, we adopted four tools. First, we already described 
the use of random effects tobit model. Second, in the probit and logit models, the observations 
were  clustered  at  bank  level,  thus  obtaining  heteroskedasticity  robust  standard  errors  and 
controlling for possible autocorrelations across the same bank. Third, we added individual bank 
                                                 
14 Since the regressors were calculated with one lag.   20
dummies  in  some  specifications  of  the  probit  and  logit  models,  thus  capturing  bank-specific 
effects that are constant over time. As regards the tobit II model, the abstention model (first step) 
included, in addition to the basic regressors, the other control variables and both individual bank 
and year dummies. Fourth, in order to control the results of the dynamic panel data regression, we 
used both the two-step Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator and the one-step system GMM 
estimator, where the dependent variable is defined as in the tobit and IV models. 
The two GMM estimators allowed us to take into account both the autocorrelation, due to 
the  presence  of  the  lagged  dependent  variable  among  the  covariates,  and  individual  effects 
characterizing the heterogeneity among the banks. The Arellano-Bond procedure consists in first 
differencing the model to eliminate the individual effects and then using the lagged levels of the 
variables as instruments for the predetermined and endogenous variables. Instruments will be 
valid,  and  will  therefore  not  be  correlated  with  errors  as  long  as  these  are  not  second-order 
autocorrelated. The one-step system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and 
Bond, 1998) is an evolution of the Arellano-Bond one. It consists in adding to the system the 
original equations in levels in order to compound additional moment conditions and increase 
efficiency, particularly suitable in finite samples (Windmeijer, 2005). 
Remarkably,  the  adoption  of  IV  regression  to  take  into  account  endogeneity  issues 
(specification 9) and the use of two GMM estimators to take into account autocorrelation and 
heterogeneity (specification 10) do not change the signs and the statistical significance of the 
regressors,  including  the  low  stability  of  both  the  funding  proxy  and  the  lagged  dependent 
variable.  Results  also  confirm  that,  when  statistically  significant,  the  latter  are  respectively 
negative and positive. Moreover, also in the IV and GMM regressions, results remained stable 
even when we ran different specifications in addition to specifications (9) and (10) and when we 
used  the  other  covariates  as  instruments  instead  of  the  two  period  lags  of  the  four  basic 
regressors. 
6.3 Substituting the dependent variable 
In  our  estimations,  as  dependent  variables,  we  used  data  on  securitizations  drawn 
alternately  from  two  different  sources  (Bank  of  Italy  accounting  supervisory  reports  and  the 
Italian Central Credit Register) and the results remained the same. Moreover, we ran regressions 
allowing  for  retained  securitized  loans  in  three  ways.  First,  as  mentioned,  we  subtracted  the 
yearly amount of all retained securitized loans from the total yearly amount of securitized loans 
before  obtaining  our  dependent  variables.  Second,  we  added  retained  securitized  loans/total 
securitized loans ratio as a control variable. Third, we corrected the solvency ratio on the basis of 
retained  securities.  Furthermore,  we  also  ran  regressions  without  taking  account  of  retained   21
securitized loans. The results did not change. Likewise, in the tobit models, in the IV regressions 
and in both the GMM estimators, we alternately used the ratio of securitized loans either on total 
assets or on total loans as dependent variables. The results were confirmed. 
6.4 Estimating the securitization of performing loans 
Since banks securitizing (only) good loans could have different determinants compared 
with banks selling (also) bad loans, we ran an additional regression, where the dependent variable 
was the ratio of securitized performing loans (thus excluding bad securitized loans) on total assets 
(or total loans). The results of all covariates were confirmed including or not including the ratio 
between bad loans and total loans in the estimations. When this ratio is included, it assumes the 
negative sign instead of the positive sign as in all our specifications consistently showing that 
banks characterized by a high weight of bad loans carry out less securitizations of in bonis loans. 
6.5 Controlling for the initial decision of engaging in securitization 
Our results suggest that the decisions by banks to start engaging in securitization and 
subsequent securitization events are not driven by different forces. To further control for this, we 
adopted another estimation model: a duration model based on the Weibull distribution. In our 
framework  the  hazard  model  allows  us  to  estimate  the  length  of  time  that  elapsed  from  the 
promulgation of the Italian law on securitization until its first application by each bank. This 
model also confirmed the sense of our four basic covariates: in addition to being more likely to 
perform securitization and for a larger amount, less capitalized, less profitable, less liquid and 
riskier banks used securitizations earlier. 
6.6 Substituting our regressors 
We substituted some regressors with variables defined in a different way. In particular, we 
focused our attention on the proxy of funding needs that, as mentioned, is the least statistically 
significant covariate among the four basic determinants proposed by the literature. We already 
argued that the positive effect of the growth rate of loans recognizes that funding reasons play a 
role. Furthermore, we used two other regressors in addition to the ratio between total deposits and 
total assets. The first is the ratio between bonds and total assets, the idea being that some banks 
could prefer or be more able to fund their businesses by issuing bonds rather than by attracting 
deposits. The second new proxy of funding needs is the ratio between government securities held 
in  bank’s  portfolio  and  total  assets.  Here  the  idea  is  that  banks  holding  more  government 
securities, which are typically very marketable, have less liquid needs. We included the three 
liquidity proxies in the estimations either all together or alternating and variously combining their 
presence or summing their values. Moreover, we used them in all our models and specifications.   22
However, the sense of the results remained the same. When the bonds/assets ratio is used alone, 
its effect is insignificant; while the government securities/assets ratio is significantly negative as 
expected. When bonds are added to deposits or when the three variables are contemporaneously 
present, the effect of the deposits/assets ratio prevails and the results follow those found for it. 
For this reason, we chose to show the results of the deposits/assets ratio. In any case, it should be 
stressed that the signs and the statistical significance of the other regressors did not change. 
Similarly,  we  substituted  other  variables.  First,  we  adopted  as  a  proxy  of  capital 
requirements the ratio alternately calculated as: at the numerator of the fraction either capital and 
reserves or mandatory capital, and at the denominator either total assets or risk-weighted assets. 
Second, we proxied the riskiness borne by banks with write-offs/write-downs of loans instead of 
bad loans. Third, we used the net interbank position as a possible proxy of the effect of profit 
opportunities and liquidity needs. All results were confirmed. 
6.7 Outliers and quantile regressions 
Results were confirmed when we allowed for outliers in each variable of our dataset, 
progressively removing 10%, 15% and 20% of tail observations. Results did not change running 
quantile regressions on all our covariates, though the levels of significance suffered from minor 
changes. This suggests that the relationship between securitization finance and its determinants 
does not change after a certain threshold. For example, as far as the role of capital is concerned, 
even among more capitalized banks securitization activity decreases in the solvency ratio. 
7. Summing-up 
Current events in financial markets have increased the interest in studying bank loan 
securitization. In this paper we investigated empirically its ex ante determinants in the years 
before the crisis analysing individual Italian bank data from 2000 to 2006. Our results are based 
on a wide number of models, tests and checks. The use of several methods allowed us to control 
for endogeneity and to take account of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems. Our 
outcomes confirm that in Italy, even though securitization finance increased, it was on average 
low.  The  results  also  show  that  bank  loan  securitization  was  a  many-sided  decision.  Less 
capitalized, less profitable, less liquid and riskier banks were more likely to securitize their loans, 
they securitized more and they securitized earlier. Moreover, larger and more diversified banks 
and those with faster growing loans and with previous practice engaged in more securitization 
activity. Once banks securitized, they seemed to operate with relatively low capital (although 
with more capital than that required by mandatory requirements), they had fewer bad loans and 
deposits and they seemed to reach higher profits.   23  24
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Bank loan securitization activity in Italy: some structural indicators 
  
1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Servicing in securitization  n.a.  n.a.  7  8  8  9  12  10  10 
included in banking groups  n.a.  n.a.  0  1  2  2  5  1  1 
additions during the year  n.a.  n.a.  3  1  1  1  2  2  1 
Special purpose vehicles   n.a.  n.a.  67  133  178  206  237  276  312 
 included in banking groups  n.a.  n.a.  18  30  37  43  42  44  47 
additions during the year  n.a.  n.a.  50  66  45  33  35  45  46 
Total: Servicing + SPVs  3  23  74  141  186  215  249  286  322 
included in banking groups  2  6  18  31  39  45  47  45  48 
additions during the year  n.a.  n.a.  53  67  46  34  37  47  47 
                             
Number of banks performing at 
least one securitization 
operation 
n.a.  29  45  86  74  75  94  115  138 
included in banking groups  n.a.  26  35  57  55  50  60  50  n.a. 
Number of securitization 
operations  n.a.  51  93  220  254  260  307  318  314 
Total amount of securitization 
operations (billions of euros)  n.a.  15.8  20.5  18.0  13.7  13.9  29.6  28.2  37.1 
Average amount of each operation 
(millions of euros)  n.a.  309  220  82  54  53  96  88  118 
 
Source: Bank of Italy's Annual Report and supervision reports.   30
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Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variable  Proxy  Obs  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max 
Securitization dummy    5,482  0.094  0.293  0  1 
Securitization dummy (corrected 
for retained securitized loans) 
dependent variable in 
the probit and logit 
models 
3,923  0.083  0.277  0  1 
Year sum of monthly securitized 
loans / Total assets    5,481  0.011  0.228  0  0.110 
Securitized loans (corrected for 
retained securitized loans) / Total 
assets  
dependent variable in 
the tobit models, 
hazard model, IV 
regression and GMM 
estimators 
3,923  0.010  0.267  0  0.110 
Retained securitized loans / Total 
securitized loans  not transferred risk  5,445  0.089  1.89  0  1 
Total deposits / Total assets  funding  5,481  0.439  0.823  0  1 
Bonds / Total assets  funding  5,481  0.163  0.126  0  0.894 
Government securities / Total 
assets  liquidity  5,481  0.142  0.122  0  0.818 
Bad loans / Total loans  risk transfer  5,471  0.049  0.083  0  0.333 
Regulatory capital / Total credit 
and market risk weighted assets  capital relief  4,772  0.103  0.045  0.055  0.471 
Net interbank position / Total 
assets 
liquidity and profit 
opportunities  5,481  0.022  0.252  -1  1 
ROE  profit opportunities  5,419  0.111  0.563  -0.038  0.904 
Ln (Total asset)  size  5,481  5.938  1.800  2.564  10.998 




4,519  0.034  2.460  -1  0.702 
Non-interest income/ Interest 
income 
businesses’ 
diversification  5,105  1.673  5.541  -2.856  14 
    













































































in a  
group 
Securitization dummy 
(corrected for retained 
securitized loans) 
1.000                           
Securitized loans (corrected 
for retained securitized loans) / 
Total assets (t) 
0.103*  1.000                         
T deposits / T assets (t-1)  -0.049*  -0.021  1.000                       
Bonds / Total assets (t-1)  0.109*  -0.022  -0.085*  1.000                     
Government securities / 
Total assets (t-1)  -0.223*  -0.040  0.101*  -0.061*  1.000                   
Bad loans / Total loans (t-1)  -0.011*  0.237*  0.175*  -0.148*  0.149*  1.000                 
Regulatory capital / T risk 
weighted assets (t-1)   -0.194*  -0.004  0.137*  -0.268*  0.430*  0.250*  1.000               
ROE (t-1)  -0.030  -0.022  -0.010  -0.065*  -0.001  0.014  0.111  1.000             
Net interbank position / 
Total assets (t-1)  -0.103*  -0.067*  0.186*  0.016  0.230*  0.114*  0.278*  -0.053*  1.000           
Ln (Total asset) (t-1)  0.364*  0.034  -0.187*  0.090*  -0.467*  -0.225*  -0.406*  -0.051*  -0.324*  1.000         
Growth rate of loans (t-1)  0.003  -0.002  0.033  0.017  0.021  -0.084*  -0.017  0.001  0.008  -0.011  1.000       
Non-interest income / 
Interest income (t-1)  -0.006  0.069*  -0.001  -0.086*  -0.060*  -0.027  0.046*  0.000  0.087*  0.008  0.015  1.000     
Cooperative bank dummy   -0.235*  -0.036  0.106*  0.157*  0.561*  0.030  0.212*  0.198*  0.168*  -0.655*  0.053*  -0.091*  1.000   
Dummy for banks involved 
in a group  0.271*  0.039  -0.103*  -0.102*  -0.554*  -0.024  -0.272*  -0.184*  -0.187*  0.680*  -0.053*  0.082*  -0.816*  1.000 
 
                  
Table 4. Determinants of bank loan securitization activity 
Basic specification (1) and specification (2) including the lagged dependent variable 
 
Probit  Tobit I  Tobit II  Random effects Tobit 
Regressors 
(1)    (2)    (1)    (2)    (1)    (1)    (2)   
-0.656  **  -0.511  *  -0.566  ***  -0.741  ***  -0.091  ***  -0.011    -0.078  *** 
Total deposits / Total 
assets (t-1)  0.317    0.299    0.105    0.145    0.260    0.008    0.026   
1.261  ***  1.257  ***  2.501  ***  2.688  ***  1.448  ***  0.984  ***  1.163  *** 
Bad loans / Total 
loans (t-1)  0.408    0.403    0.236    0.269    0.085    0.061    0.077   
-11.778  ***  -9.531  ***  -9.431  ***  -9.991  ***  -0.415  ***  -0.313  ***  -0.384  ***  Regulatory capital / 
Total credit and 
market risk weighted 
assets (t-1) 
2.136    1.791    0.911    1.017    0.119    0.089    0.118 
 
-3.399  ***  -2.962  ***  -2.627  ***  -2.741  ***  -0.178  **  -0.147  ***  -0.147  ** 
ROE (t-1) 
0.916    0.794    0.426    0.482    0.071    0.043    0.061 
 
    1.108  ***   
 
1.748  ***          -0.001   
Lagged dependent 
variable      0.101        0.303            0.093 
 




0.035  **  0.008 
 
0.035  ** 
Constant 
0.158    0.137    0.068    0.077    0.014    0.009    0.014   
               
-0.022   
       
Lambda 
n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    0.077    n.a.    n.a.   
Observations  3,749    3,749    3,913    3,145    3,162    3,913    3,145   
Number of groups  n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    760    707   
Pseudo R2  0.113    0.187    0.141    0.149    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.   
McFadden R2  0.486    0.529    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.   
Wald Chi2  105.93    242.48    n.a.    n.a.    302.33    264.93    234.17   
Rho  n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    -0.078    n.a.    n.a.   
LR Chi2   n.a.    n.a.    378.8    351.18    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.   
 
This table reports regression coefficients and associated standard errors in italics. Dependent variables: in the probit model dummy assuming value 1 
if bank i carried out at least one securitization operation during year t; in the tobit models and in the Heckman two-step estimator, the share of yearly 
securitized loans by each bank on total assets. We subtracted the yearly amount of all retained securitized loans from the total year amount of 
securitized loans before obtaining our dependent variables. Specifications (1) and (2) are the same for each method, varying one from the other due 
to the presence of the lagged dependent variable. As for the tobit II model, the abstention model (first step) includes, in addition to the basic 
regressors, the other control variables and both individual bank and year dummies. ***, **, * denote, respectively, statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level; n.a. means not applicable. Blanks indicate that the variable was not used in the specification.   34 
Table 5. Securitizing banks: 









mean  mean 
difference 










after the first 
securitization 
mean 
                    
Supervisory 
capital / Total 
assets  
0.089  0.094  ***  ***  0.083  n.s.  0.086 
                    
ROE   0.063  0.055  *  ***  0.063  n.s.  0.072 
                    
Total deposits 
/ Total assets   0.379  0.426  ***  ***  0.351  n.s.  0.338 
                    
Bad loans / 
Total loans   0.042  0.047  *  **  0.037  n.s.  0.038 
 
 
Table reports the means and the statistical significance of the differences of the four basic determinants of bank loan securitization 
when we split the sample period of securitizing banks in three spans: the years before the first securitization, the year of the first 
securitization and the years after the first securitization. *** and * denote, respectively, statistical significance at 1 and 10% level; 
n.s. means statistically not significant.  
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Table 6. Determinants of bank loan securitization activity 
Specifications (3) - (8) including control variables 
 
Regressors  Probit  Logit  Tobit I  Random effects Tobit 
  (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)     (8)   
-1.341            -0.500  ***  -0.098  ***  -0.099  ***  Total deposits / Total 
assets (t-1)  0.946            0.108    0.026    0.027   
12.559  ***  2.181  ***  3.432  ***  2.563  ***  1.548  ***  1.549  ***  Bad loans / Total 
loans (t-1)  4.538    0.661    0.307    0.238    0.088    0.088   
-17.534  **  -15.735  ***  -6.561  ***  -9.506  ***  -0.467  ***  -0.474  ***  Regulatory capital / 
Total credit and 
market risk weighted 
assets 
(t-1) 
7.917    3.645    0.999    0.915    0.118    0.122   
-9.096  **  -4.921  ***  -1.854  ***  -2.618  ***  -0.159  **  -0.161  ** 
ROE (t-1) 
4.017    1.541    0.482    0.427    0.071    0.071   
    0.229  ***  0.159  ***     
       
Ln (Total assets)(t-1) 
    0.053    0.016               
    1.777  ***  1.381  ***     
        Lagged dependent 
variable      0.177    0.291       
       
Bank-by-bank dummy  included         
             
Year-by-year dummy           
  included           
        0.032  *     
0.025  ***  0.025  ***  Growth rate of loans 
(t-1)          0.019        0.006    0.006   
        0.017  ***     
0.005  ***  0.005  ***  Non-interest income/ 
Interest income (t-1)          0.004        0.001    0.001   
               
    -0.001    Cooperative bank 
dummy                 
    0.018   
               
    -0.004    Dummy for banks 
involved  
in a group                 
    0.019   
0.459    -2.897  ***  -1.646  ***  -0.208  **  0.026  **  0.029   
Constant 
0.319    0.562    0.168    0.098    0.014    0.022   
Observations  923    3,749    3,059    3,913    3,126    3,126   
Number of groups  n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    701    701   
Pseudo R2  0.173    0.191    0.191    0.146    n.a.    n.a.   
McFadden R2  0.734    0.532    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.    n.a.   
Wald Chi2  n.a.    299.29    n.a.    n.a.    342.14    342.2   
LR Chi2   n.a.    n.a.    444.69    393.53    n.a.    n.a.   
 
This table reports regression coefficients and associated standard errors in italics. Dependent variables: in the probit and logit models, dummies 
assume value 1 if bank i carried out at least one securitization operation during the year t; in the tobit models, the share of yearly securitized 
loans by each bank on total assets. We subtracted the yearly amount of all retained securitized loans from the total yearly amount of securitized 
loans before obtaining our dependent variables. For the sake of completeness and brevity, the results of each specification are shown by way of 
example on different models. ***, **, * denote, respectively, statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels; n.a. means not applicable. 
Blanks indicate that the variable was not used in the specification.   36 
Table 7. Determinants of bank loan securitization activity 
Specifications (9) and (10) allowing for endogeneity, autocorrelation and heterogeneity 
 
IV    Arellano-
Bond 
System 
GMM  Regressors 
(9)  (10)  (10) 
-0.130 
 
0.002    -0.064  ** 
Total deposits / Total assets (t-1) 
0.082    0.002    0.031   
1.346  ***  0.567  ***  1.307  *** 
Bad loans / Total loans (t-1) 
0.091    0.094    0.095   
-0.431  ***  -0.139  ***  -0.394  ***  Regulatory capital / Total credit and 
market risk weighted assets (t-1)  0.137    0.048    0.131   
-0.134  *  -0.08  ***  -0.163  ** 
ROE (t-1) 
0.079    0.024    0.082   
-0.029    0.01  ***  -0.010   
Lagged dependent variable 
0.097    0.00    0.106   
    0.003  **  0.006  ***  Non-interest income/ 
Interest income (t-1)      0.001    0.001   
0.052  *  0.003  ***  0.017   
Constant 
0.028    0.001    0.015   
Observations  3,136    3,050    3,067   
Number of groups  n.a.    683    684   
Adj-R2  0.065    n.a.    n.a.   
Wald Chi2  n.a.    130.22    212.76   
Over-identifying restrictions: p-value  n.a.    0.626    0.000   
Test for AR(1):  p-value  n.a.    0.029    0.373   
Test for AR(2):  p-value  n.a.    0.789    0.844   
 
The table reports regression coefficients and associated standard errors in italics. Dependent variable: the 
share of yearly securitized loans by each bank on total assets. We subtracted the yearly amount of all 
retained securitized loans from the total yearly amount of securitized loans. For the sake of completeness 
and brevity, the results are only shown for two specifications. Instruments are the lagged regressors. In 
the two-step Arellano-Bond (1991) GMM estimator, tests for AR(1) and AR(2) check that the average 
autocovariance in first order and second order residuals, respectively,  is zero. In the one-step system 
GMM estimator, tests for AR(1) and AR(2) check for the presence of first order and second order serial 
correlation in the first-difference residuals. ***, **, * denote, respectively, statistical significance at the 
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